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Abstract 
 
In this paper, we analyze the private participation in prison services in three countries: Brazil, France, and the 
United  States.  We  highlight  striking  differences  in  efficiency  between  these  countries  and  argue  that  the 
explanation for these differences is not restricted to the way property rights are distributed (i.e. public vs. private 
management). Instead, our analysis suggests that understanding those differences also requires an analysis of the 
incentives provided by contractual choices as well as decision and revenue rights distribution and institutional 
constraints. The theoretical literature usually analyzes these blocks separately, and often focuses on property 
rights distribution. We argue that an efficient arrangement is the result of the way these elements are combined, 
giving rise to a distinctive governance structure. 
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Introduction 
 
 
In the last twenty years, several governments throughout the world have introduced reforms as a 
means to leverage investments in public services through the private sector (Estache, 2006). The water 
(Chong, Huet,  Saussier,  &  Steiner,  2006),  electricity  (Glachant  &  Finon,  2003),  roads  (Athias  & 
Saussier, 2007), telecommunications (Levy & Spiller, 1994) and also even more human and less-
infrastructure sectors such as health care (Albreht & Klazinga, 2009) and social security (Cronqvist 
& Thaler, 2004) have been analyzed. However, little is known about the public and private governance 
of criminal justice services, such as prisons (Cabral & Azevedo, 2008). Researchers seldom focus their 
studies on the correctional sector, probably because the process of obtaining relevant information is 
not an easy task: non-consolidated data and confidentiality are factors that often disturb and frequently 
impede the execution of research in this sector (Dilulio, 1996). Because of this, the issues related to 
prison performance remain a kind of black-box when compared to other public service utilities.  
Notwithstanding, prisons are often used as an example to illustrate theoretical models concerned 
with the proper scope of government (Bennett & Iossa, 2006; Hart, 2003; Hart, Shleifer, & Vishny, 
1997). This type of public service implies several tasks that can be split between public and private 
authorities and that may differ depending on the kind of prisoners. In addition, the management of 
prison services is quite complex due to the diversity of such tasks. In fact, in order to prevent escapes, 
riots, and so on, prison managers must provide prisoners with food as well as healthcare, judicial and 
reentry services, all of which require the coordination of different institutions and organizations. Of 
course, this interaction is not conflict free; the tensions that may arise between these stakeholders can 
create inefficient arrangements. For this reason, prisons constitute a good theoretical example and an 
interesting empirical case to study. 
In this paper, we propose some partial results of the Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) in prison 
services of three countries, based on previous empirical literature as well as information we collected: 
Brazil, France, and the United States (U.S.). In the present paper, PPP refers to different modes of 
private participation (privatizations, concessions and outsourcing) in the provision of public utilities.  
These three countries are especially interesting because of the variation in the degree of private 
involvement in prison service in each country. In some states of the U.S., full privatization may take 
place, whereas the participation of private operators in prisons services in Brazil and France is limited. 
Compared to Brazil, the role of private companies in France is even narrower, with fewer delegated 
functions.  The  three  countries  also  differ  in  their  criminal  policies.  The  U.S.  locks  up  a  higher 
proportion of citizens that are not a danger to society than do Brazil and France. This is reflected in the 
incarceration rates. The  U.S. has the highest incarceration rate in the  world  with 754 inmates per 
100.000 inhabitants; Brazil and France have respectively 200 and 96 inmates per 100.000 inhabitants 
(Cour  des  Comptes,  2006;  Departamento  Penitenciário  Nacional,  2008;  Sabol,  West,  &  Cooper, 
2009)
(1).  
Interestingly, the results of each country’s public-private agreements do not correspond to the 
theoretical  predictions  focusing  on  property  right  distribution  (Hart  et  al.,  1997).  In  Brazil,  we 
observed that public-private agreements have resulted in cost reductions and an increase in the quality 
of services provided, while in France, empirical findings suggest an increase in both cost and quality. 
In the U.S., we observed reductions in both cost and quality. We suggest that several contractual and 
extra-contractual dimensions may explain these results.  
We believe our paper is a contribution to the literature because our analysis has made it possible 
to partially fill the empirical gap in knowledge of prison administration. In addition, we believe our 
analysis enables the assessment of the extent to which empirical facts are connected to the theoretical 
developments concerning PPP, suggesting that the main driving factors for efficient arrangements do 
not depend only on property rights distribution but also on the incentives resulting from other factors 
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We divide the paper as follows. The next section considers how property rights could have an 
impact on efficiency. We discuss the cost versus quality trade-off in the private provision of public 
services  (Hart  et  al.,  1997).  We  also  briefly  consider  other  dimensions  that  may  also  influence 
performances of prison services. Following some methodological considerations, we present the cases 
of PPP in prisons in the three countries, showing the main results obtained and the peculiarities of the 
sector.  Further,  we  discuss  why  the  empirical  results  differ  from  one  country  to  another.  We 
demonstrate that the main driving factors do not rely on one particular element – like property rights 
themselves – but on  how  elements such as decision rights, revenue rights and property rights are 
combined and aligned, giving rise to a coherent governance structure. We argue that the effect of 
private participation is dependent on this proper alignment. This may explain why private participation 
in prison services has very different results in each location. 
 
 
Prison Governance Structures and Efficiency 
 
 
PPP and the impact of property rights 
 
Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) is a general term to designate the cooperative arrangements 
between public and private sector actors (Hodge & Greve, 2007). The expression PPP includes the 
Project Finance  Initiative Model (PFI), which is  largely  disseminated  in the  United Kingdom and 
Australia.  Under  PFI-type,  the  government  specifies  the  output  but  the  private  actors  retain  the 
residual control rights regarding the service’s delivery (Bennet & Iossa, 2010). In this sense, the PPP 
concept is more comprehensive, covering several other modes of private participation (privatization, 
concessions, outsourcing, institutional cooperation for joint production, and public policy networks) in 
the provision of public utilities (Chong et al., 2006; Guasch, Laffont, & Straub, 2008; Hodge & Greve, 
2007).  
In a time of fiscal constraints, governments have used PPP in order to supply services that had 
been previously provided publicly. However, although private participation may have been seen as a 
solution to avoid public and market failures, results vary according to the sector in which PPP were 
implemented, raising questions concerned with the efficiency of PPP (Hodge & Greve, 2007).  
Several theoretical approaches may be useful to study the different dimensions of PPP and their 
impacts  on  costs  and  managerial  innovations  that  might  lead  to  productive  efficiency  in  prison 
services. One obvious and important dimension to consider is the distribution of property rights. One 
of the most prominent contributions to an understanding of the public versus private dilemma is the 
seminal paper of Hart, Shleifer and Vishny (1997), which focuses on the comparison between public 
and  private  participation  in  the  provision  of  prison  services.  The  authors  adopted  an  incomplete 
contract view, where the private operator’s residual control rights would reduce production costs at the 
expense of the quality of the services provided. In order to improve quality, the private operator must 
incur both the costs of quality provision and the costs of influencing the government to accept changes 
(the  government  must  agree  to  pay  for  improvements  through  a  Nash  bargaining  process). 
Consequently, the private operators have incentives to under-provide quality and to over-reduce costs 
(Hart et al., 1997). Therefore, a public mode of provision is preferred when the adverse effects of cost 
reductions  have  a  significant  impact  on  quality  levels  or  where  there  is  limited  room  for  quality 
innovations  by  private  actors.  The  impact  of  the  distribution  of  property  rights  is  linked  to  the 
incompleteness of contractual agreements between the government and the private operators, which 
generate residual rights of control over the assets (Hart, 2003). Since it would be very difficult to 
contractually delineate certain tasks, such as the use of force to be employed by the private operator or 
the  exact capabilities  of the  workers, Hart  et al. (1997), are skeptical about privately run prisons 
because  of the  important adverse  effect  reduced cost strategies  have  on  quality (i.e. under-skilled 
workers would lead to a higher rate of escapes).  S. Cabral, S. Saussier    104 
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Hart (2003) completes the Hart et al. (1997), picture by considering the question of bundling 
(i.e. one single contract for building and operating) in prisons when a PPP is concerned. He concludes 
that unbundled modes of contracting (two contracts: one for building and another for operating the 
prison) are suitable if the quality of the construction can be well-specified ex-ante. However, PPP 
would be recommended when the quality of the service can be well defined. In this case, private 
companies would not constrain their building costs as this might have repercussions for the normal 
operations of the correctional facility in the future. In the particular case of prisons, it is very difficult 
to specify the service requirement in the contract; therefore, the author concludes that services should 
be carried out under the unbundling regime. In the same vein, Bennett and Iossa (2006) posit that 
public-private agreements can be desirable in situations in which potential innovations may result in 
cost-reductions. On the other hand, PPP can lead to malignant effects. In the presence of opportunistic 
behavior,  either  from  governments  or  from  private  firms,  underinvestment  and  rent-seeking 
renegotiations are likely to occur (Guasch et al., 2008). In all papers based on the incomplete contract 
theory,  the  distribution  of  property  rights  is  at  the  core  of  the  PPP  analysis.  Nevertheless,  other 
relevant elements should be brought in the analysis to give a broader view of what is going on and to 
improve our understanding of prison efficiency.  
 
Other relevant elements 
 
Recognizing  the  need  to  move  beyond  property  rights  distribution,  recent  theoretical 
developments highlight the fact that property rights can be thought of as a bundle of decision and 
revenue  rights  that  can  be  partly  transferable  through  contractual  agreements  (Baker,  Gibbons,  & 
Murphy, 2008). The owner of an asset (or the owner of the decision rights over the asset) has the right 
to decide  what to do  with the asset, since  his actions are not forbidden by the regulations of the 
contract or by the law. This stresses the fact that alternative governance structures are not  merely 
alternative  distributions  of  property  rights,  and  may  give  rise  to  more  possible  combinations  of 
property and decision rights, leading to complex hybrid forms of organization (Ménard, 2004). 
For our purposes, what is interesting here is that PPP are clearly hybrid organizational choices 
(Makadok & Coff, 2009; Ménard, 2004). Such hybrid choices may vary greatly from one form to 
another, depending on the way the contractual parties decide to share decision and revenue rights. 
Property rights are pushed to the background and it is the way the decision rights are contractually 
split that completes the picture. According to the contractual design chosen and the institutional setting 
(which vary from one region/country to another), certain changes might be observed in the level of 
decision rights assigned to private operators. These changes manifest in the structures of rewards and 
sanctions  to  be  applied  in  the  case  of  inappropriate  actions  and  in  the  limits  for  government 
intervention  (Shirley  &  Menard,  2002).  Of  course,  these  factors  have  a  direct  impact  on  PPP 
performance indicators and, as a consequence, on social welfare (see Desrieux, 2006 for a similar 
argument).    
These developments therefore suggest that the hypotheses found in the Hart et al. (1997), and 
Hart (2003) might be blurred by contractual choices and the  way  decision and revenue rights are 
attributed and affect the parties’  incentives. Indeed,  as we  will see  later on, considering the three 
countries  we  studied  in  this  paper,  they  clearly  differ  with  regard  to  the  way  decision  rights  are 
distributed to private operators. 
 
 
Data and Methods 
 
 
In  order  to  assess  prison  privatization  and  its  impact  on  performance,  we  focus  on  three 
countries: Brazil, France, and the United States. There is a variation in the degree of outsourcing of 
prison  services  among  these  countries.  The  U.S.  model  provides  a  good  example  of  PPP  with  a 
massive  participation  of  private  actors,  with  complete  delegation  to  private  operators  in  prisons 
(privatization).  Differently,  Brazil  and  France  present  limited  delegation  compared  to  the  U.S.  In Organizing Prisons through Public-Private Partnerships  105 
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Brazil, private operators perform more tasks than in France, but fewer in comparison with the U.S. 
context. In this sense, the  U.S. and French  models are seen as polar opposites in terms  of prison 
public-private agreements; meanwhile, Brazil provides a model somewhere between the two extremes. 
There are, however, some similarities between prisons in these three countries as they tend to lock up 
minorities, poor and less educated people and are subject to complaints of brutality against inmates. 
They  also  experience  similar  challenges  regarding  overcrowding  rates  (Chantraine,  2004;  Human 
Right Watch, 1998; Wacquant, 2001).  
To be able to compare the situation in these three countries, we use an exploratory approach 
(Stebbins, 2001). While the U.S. case is fairly documented, this is not the case for France and Brazil, 
for  which  few  papers  grounded  in  empirical  data  exist.  In  order  to  compensate  for  these  data 
limitations in Brazil and France we conducted 23 in-depth and semi-structured interviews where pre-
formulated questions were posed at the beginning and new questions emerged during the conversation 
(Malhotra, 2007). Our interviewees  included:  executives  of private companies  in  charge  of prison 
services  (two  in  France  and  three  in  Brazil);  government  officials  from  justice  and  penitentiary 
administration (three people in France and four in Brazil); politicians (one individual in France and 
two  in  Brazil);  professionals  engaged  in  human  rights  (one  person  in  France  and  one  in  Brazil); 
wardens of publicly operated facilities (three individuals in Brazil); and wardens of privately operated 
facilities (three individuals in Brazil). Interviews were conducted between 2005 and 2008 and took 
between 60 and 180 minutes. We then analyzed the interviews by attributing succinct open codes, 
which were useful to summarize and categorize phenomena found in the texts (Myers, 2009).  
We also analyzed official documents available from prison administrations, namely: internal 
reports, government plans, internal meeting notes, and brochures of private companies involved in 
prison  services  provision.  Complementarily  we  used  secondary  data  from  existing  literature.  We 
triangulated  the  sources  of  evidence  (Stake,  1995)  in  order  to  increase  the  reliability  of  our 
interpretations. 
Regarding the limitations of the data, our work did not aim to test a hypothesis but to identify 
similarities and differences among the countries. In this sense, the limitation of case study research in 
restraining the sample size does not pose a major problem in our context (Grant, 2003).  
 
Performance indicators in prisons: cost and quality dimensions 
 
In  modern societies, the prison plays certain  crucial roles, such as: to protect citizens  from 
individuals that do not observe the formal rules; to punish criminals in order to discourage people from 
breaking the law (Artières, Lascoumes, & Salle, 2004); and to provide the conditions that make the 
inmate’s future reentry possible (Cour des Comptes, 2006).  
Following the New Public Management principles, which in fact shape the policies of several 
countries throughout the world, in order to control a prison, prison managers must manage both the 
cost  and  quality  aspects  toward  law-and-order  goals  (Boin,  James,  &  Lodge,  2006).  The  cost 
dimension is important because of the budgetary constraints governments have been experiencing in 
recent  years.  In  fact,  cost  reduction  is  one  of  the  main  objectives  of  the  new  organizational 
arrangements in the provision of public services (Boyne, Meier, O’Toole, & Walker, 2006). In theory, 
the measurement of cost indicators is not complicated. It usually involves the amount spent during the 
period of an inmate’s incarceration, which requires the consideration of certain cost dimensions, such 
as  labor,  materials,  and  electricity  among  others.  As  each  country  may  consolidate  the  financial 
information regarding the prison’s costs differently, we restrict our public versus private comparisons 
to the country level. In the three cases, we focus only on the operational costs to run the prison and do 
not take into account the construction costs. Quality-oriented performance indicators must be aligned 
with the prison’s goals mentioned above. In this way, it is essential that the correctional facility be 
able to provide the proper services that generate an adequate environment and preserve the physical 
and  moral  integrity  of  the  inmates,  employees  and  visitors,  as  well  as  facilitate  criminals’ 
rehabilitation processes. From this perspective, quality aspects can be grouped into three dimensions: S. Cabral, S. Saussier    106 
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(a) recidivism rates; (b) safety and order indicators (deaths, assaults, escapes, riots, etc.); (c) services 
offered  to  inmates  (food,  medical  and  legal  assistance,  rehabilitation  services,  etc.)  (Cabral  & 
Azevedo, 2008; Dilulio, 1996).  
The process of assessing these indicators may present certain problems. Besides the procedural 
issues for collecting and consolidating the relevant information, some aspects are very subjective. It is 
difficult to assess the quality of the meals provided to inmates or the level of force applied to contain 
riots and assaults (Hart et al., 1997). For these reasons, we focus on quality indicators that can be 
assessed  through  quantitative  aspects,  i.e.,  observable  and  measurable  features,  such  as:  escapes, 
deaths, medical appointments and so on. Although recidivism is one of the key performance indicators 
in prison management (Beck, 2001), we could not find evidence of recidivism records in Brazil and 
France. 
 
 
Private Participation and Performance in Prisons: Some Evidence in Three Different 
Countries 
 
 
Prison privatization in the United States 
 
In  the  1980’s,  some  state  governments  in  the  United  States  (e.g.  Texas,  Louisiana,  and 
Tennessee) found in the private sector a way to cope with the increase in the inmate population and the 
corresponding costs of operation and maintenance. Although the decision to privatize in the U.S. is 
frequently related to  more conservative political  cultures, there  is  evidence that even  more liberal 
states  adopted  private  management  in  response  to  budgetary  constraints  and  prison  overcrowding 
(Price & Riccucci, 2005).  
The first experience of private participation took place in Tennessee in 1983. Today, more than 
30  states  have  adopted  private  solutions.  There  are  roughly  270  privately-operated  correctional 
facilities. On December 31, 2008, they housed almost 128,524 inmates, which represent 8.5 % of the 
inmate population of the state and federal correctional systems. In some states, such as New Mexico, 
around  46%  of  inmates  are  held  at  private  facilities.  Considering  the  local  jails  run  by  counties, 
privately operated prisons house 7.4% of the total inmates in custody in the United States, which total 
2,304,115 inmates (Sabol et al., 2009). 
There are some studies in the United States that focus on the comparative aspects of public and 
private  governance. Despite the claims of cherry-picking (Oppel, 2011) and correctional creaming 
(Dilulio, 1996) ― i.e., private prisons in U.S. allegedly house relatively health and easy-going inmates 
― the existing studies are almost unanimous in concluding the superiority of private governance in 
terms of cost-reduction (Archambeault & Deis, 1996; Bayer & Pozen, 2005; Blustein & Cohen, 2003; 
Guppy, 2003; Mitchell, 2003).  
The work of Archambeault and Deis (1996) concerns three similar prisons located in the state of 
Louisiana. Two of them were managed by private companies and the other by state government. In 
order to assure the validity of the conclusions, the authors utilized descriptive statistics tools. The 
authors concluded that private prisons present better performance in terms of cost reduction when 
compared to the publicly operated unit. On the other hand, public prisons seemed more efficient in 
preventing escapes and providing a broader range of treatment, recreation, social services and other 
services to inmates.  
Blustein and Cohen (2003) found that states that had some of their prisoners in privately owned 
or operated prisons experienced less growth in the cost of housing their prisoners than states that used 
only  public  prisons.  By  comparing  the  cost  performance  indicators  in  46  states,  Mitchell  (2003) 
confirms the superiority of private companies in terms of cost reduction. Guppy (2003) reached  a 
similar conclusion and also sustains that prison privatization tends to offer state officers a proven way Organizing Prisons through Public-Private Partnerships  107 
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to reduce costs. Morris (2007) analyzes prison privatization in the state of Mississippi and shows that a 
legal  imposition  determines  that  “any  fees  paid  to  non-state  entities  for  the  incarceration  of  state 
prisoners must be a minimum of ten percent less than the state’s cost to house comparable inmates” 
(pp. 325-326). In addition, the author explains that private companies have “suffered a shortage of 
qualified personnel at times” (p. 333), which may affect the quality of confinement.  
An interesting econometrical test concerning the performance of for-profit (private companies) 
and non-profit (public management and NGO’s) juvenile correctional facilities can be found in Bayer 
and Pozen (2005). Using the state of Florida as a reference, the authors corroborated the findings of 
Hart  et  al.  (1997)  by  concluding  that  for-profit  facilities  led  to  cost  reduction  and  a  statistically 
significant increase in recidivism. Thus, the short-run savings offered by for-profit over non-profit 
management are negated in the long run due to increased recidivism rates. Given the many legal, 
ethical, and political complications associated with profit-seeking correctional facilities, the authors 
conclude that Florida’s juvenile justice system should move away from the use of for-profit facilities. 
In the same vein, Camp and Daggett (2005) performed a public versus private comparison in prisons 
managed by the Federal Bureau of Prisons to evaluate inmates’ misconducts using hierarchical and 
linear modeling. Their results show that private prisons did not perform as well as public prisons.   
Lukemeyer and McCorkle (2006), in an extensive study covering 873 correctional facilities in 
the U.S. (762 state facilities, 93 federal prisons and 18 privately operated facilities) observed that even 
though,  as  a  group,  private  prisons  were  less  likely  to  experience  violence,  private  prisons  with 
violence exhibited the highest rate of violence. Authors suggest that among private prisons in the U.S. 
there may be two groups: one group that is very effective in controlling violence and one that is much 
less effective. Nevertheless, this conclusion must be viewed with caution, given the small number of 
private prisons in the sample.  
Although, to the best of our knowledge, there is no study in U.S. with a centralized database 
containing information on both public and private prisons that could contribute to better clarify the 
debate (Perrone & Pratt, 2003), the elements above shed some light on the public versus private debate 
in the correctional sector. In general, considering the incentive structure and the types of contractual 
arrangements between private operators and public authorities, one might observe a trade-off between 
cost-reduction and quality deterioration in the private provision of prison services in the United States.  
 
The delegation of non-core activities in the French correctional service 
 
The foundations for private participation in the French correctional services were built in 1987, 
when the Programme 13,000 was announced (Lazerges, 1997). The original proposal was to adopt 
the U.S. model in France; i.e. 13,000 new beds would be created and operated by private companies in 
order to deal with the prison’s overcrowding problem during a time of budget constraints (Thibault, 
1995).  
However, several political discussions resulted in changing the original plan of full privatization 
to a partial transfer (Salle, 2009). The French  government found an  intermediate solution:  hybrid 
management  (gestion  mixte).  Through  a  competitive  bidding  process,  private  companies  were 
contracted to build the prisons (Cour des Comptes, 2006). However, the responsibility for managing 
and controlling the correctional facilities remained with civil servants, including the decisions related 
to the use of force. Several services were originally delegated to private companies such as hostelry 
(food, hygiene, and cleaning services), medical care, reentry services, and the exploitation of labor 
activities. Civil servants perform the activities of management (warden), external vigilance and some 
administrative duties (greffe). Correctional officers – responsible for performing routine duties within 
the prisons – are also civil servants. Thus, private participation is very limited in France, as non-civil 
servant employees in prisons represent only approximately 20 % of staff (Lazerges, 1997).  
The  first  prison  to  use  hybrid  management  was  in  1990.  Additionally,  other  prisons  under 
hybrid management were built during the first decade of the 21
st century. In 2007, 30% of inmates 
were housed in prisons using hybrid management. By the end of 2009, there were 40 prisons of this S. Cabral, S. Saussier    108 
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type in France, housing 20,000 of its 55,000 inmates, which represented roughly 36% of the total 
inmate population. In 2010, the French administration launched a new privatization program and by 
the end of 2012, more than 50% of inmates will be in prisons using hybrid management or in publicly 
operated  prisons  with  food  and  maintenance  services  provided  by  private  companies  (Cour  des 
Comptes, 2010).  
Surprisingly, there are almost no studies that compare the relative performance of prisons under 
hybrid  management  and  the  facilities  with  traditional  provisions.  At  this  time,  the  only  available 
source is two reports from the French government (Cour des Comptes, 2006, 2010). Although the 
reports are not extensive, as they do not concern all French prisons and thus do not provide data 
suitable for an econometric test, their main findings are useful in understanding what is going on in the 
sector. The main reason for the lack of studies is most likely due to the difficulty in obtaining data. For 
nearly a year, we tried unsuccessfully to collect the necessary data from the French Ministry of Justice 
for a comparative econometric test. In addition to the difficulties imposed by the government, we also 
observed  (through  successive  interactions  with  public  representatives)  that  the  databases  with  the 
relevant information are not available because the data is not consolidated. 
In  France,  three  companies  specializing  in  facilities  management  provide  prison  services  – 
GEPSA (SUEZ Group); SIGES (Sodexo Group); and IDEX as of the end of 2009. As we observed 
during the interviews, they are geographically distributed throughout France. Despite the fact that the 
participation  of  private  companies  is  not  particularly  extensive,  it  is  possible  to  identify  certain 
positive spillovers. As mentioned by one executive interviewed and later confirmed by a government 
official and also by the French government reports (Cour des Comptes, 2006, 2010), companies in 
charge  of  prison  operations  in  France  were  able  to  adapt  certain  management  techniques  learned 
elsewhere in the private sector and apply them in the prison sector. As a result, the private operator 
presented  superior  performance  standards  in  terms  of  asset  maintenance,  the  quality  of  the  food 
provided  to  inmates  (essential  for  cooling  internal  tensions),  cleaning,  and  health  care  (Cour  des 
Comptes, 2006). Official reports also recognize that the hybrid management provides better reentry 
services. Private operators organize the labor activities in such a way that allows inmates conciliating 
paid activities and educational assignments. For instance, at the Val d’Oise prison 65% of the inmates 
allowed to  work  were also  enrolled in  other educational or cultural activities (Cour des Comptes, 
2010).     
Although private operators in some areas perform better than entirely public-operated prisons, 
the hybrid-managed prisons are more costly when compared to similar publicly held prisons. Table 1 
illustrates that prisons with private operation are up to 33.4% less costly.  
 
Table 1 
 
Daily Costs (Euros) in French Prisons 1999-2003  
 
  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003 
Daily Costs in Hybrid Prisons  53.81  60.17  NA  56.41  53.27 
Daily Costs in  Comparable Public Prisons  43.73  45.12  NA  52.00  45.83 
Difference  23.05%  33.36%  NA  8.48%  16.23% 
Note. Source: Cour des Comptes. (2006). Garde et réinsertion-La gestion des prisons [Rapport public thématique]. France, 
Auteur. 
In our interviews with government officials and private executives we ascertained that these 
actors agree that the reasons for such disparities are due to: (a) additional fiscal taxes; (b) increased 
quality in response to more severe contractual obligations; (c) profit margin of the private operator; (d) 
absence of significant differences in the salaries of public and private employees, which means that 
cost savings cannot be originated from lower salaries. In their official reports, the French authorities 
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Thus, unlike in the U.S., in France we observe that private provision of prison services may lead 
to an increase in both the cost and quality aspects.   
 
The Brazilian experience: between the French and U.S. models 
 
With an inmate population of roughly 446,687 prisoners as of the end of 2008 (Brasil, 2009), 
the Brazilian correctional system is known for its riots, escapes, corruption, high recidivism rates and 
overcrowding.  
In  order to  deal  with such constraints,  subnational  governments  have  decided to utilize the 
private sector for correctional activities. After numerous discussions, Brazil adopted a model where 
the government retains the ultimate responsibility for an inmate’s custody, remaining in charge of the 
external  security  and  the  management  of  the  facility  (i.e.,  warden,  vice-warden  and  security 
coordinator). Private actors run all other services including internal security, food, medical aid, legal 
assistance, dental care, leisure, education, facilities management, and provision of vehicles (Cabral, 
Lazzarini, & Azevedo, 2010). Although inspired by the French experience, the Brazilian example is 
placed somewhere between the U.S. and French experiences, as certain activities not delegated to 
private operators in France can be outsourced in Brazil, such as internal security and legal assistance to 
inmates. On the other hand, in contrast to the U.S. full privatization model, in Brazilian outsourced 
prisons civil servants play the role of contract supervisors.  
The first experience of outsourcing in Brazil was in 1999. According to information obtained 
from Brazilian correctional departments, as of 2009 there were 14 correctional facilities operated by 
four different private companies in five different states. They house around 1.5% of the Brazilian 
inmate population.   
In  order  to  illustrate  the  situation  in  Brazil,  Cabral  and  Azevedo  (2008)  performed  a 
comparative case study of two facilities, one publicly managed and the other outsourced to a private 
company, both located in the same region, the State of Bahia. Although the facilities are similar in 
physical structure (same design), in terms of capacity (both were designed to hold 268 prisoners), and 
with regard to the inmates’ criminal profiles, there are some differences that could be associated with 
different governance structures. In terms of cost, a publicly managed prison when compared to the 
outsourced prison employs 20% more people, reports absenteeism rates that are three times higher and 
pays 60% more in salaries to correctional officers (75% of the staff). It also spent three times more on 
water and electricity costs than the private company did. Therefore, a publicly operated facility is less 
cost-effective, which is consistent with Hart et al. (1997). However, when we looked at the services 
provided to inmates,  which are a quality indicator, the results  observed  go against  the theoretical 
hypothesis  of  Hart  et  al.  (1997)  as  the  privately  operated  facility  presents  superior  results.  The 
outsourced prison provides 10 times more medical care to inmates and 20 times more legal advisors. 
No escapes or escape attempts were recorded in the privately operated facility, whereas in the public 
facility there were 8 and 25 respectively. The internal environment is less safe in the publicly operated 
facility. The indicators of assaults against other inmates and against visitors and employees are 15 
times higher.  
Cabral, Lazzarini and Azevedo (2010) discuss similar conclusions. Using a panel data analysis, 
the authors compared publicly and privately operated prisons from 2001 to 2006. The study concluded 
that outsourced prisons run at a lower cost (10% less) and have superior quality indicators (fewer 
escapes,  deaths  and  a  greater  number  of  medical  appointments).  The  authors  highlight  in  their 
conclusions the role of public supervisors in guaranteeing the quality standards in the private provision 
of correctional services, which attenuates the cost-quality dilemma. They argue that state-appointed 
wardens may have implicit incentives to enforce quality. In addition, press and NGOs seem to mitigate 
the odds of collusion between private operators and public officials.   
Ancillary, we obtained primary data from the State of Paraná, which was the first subnational 
government to outsource prisons in Brazil. Data from 2002 to 2005 (Table 2) reveal that privately 
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Although the average numbers of inmates held in publicly operated prisons is 63.3% higher compared 
to outsourced facilities, the proportional number of deaths and escapes in prisons run by government 
officers is even higher, thus suggesting increased performance of privately operated prisons.     
 
Table 2 
 
Deaths and Escapes in Correctional Facilities of the State of Paraná, Brazil – 2002-2005  
 
   
2002  2003  2004  2005  Average 
Deaths  Public    8  5  8  6  6.8 
 
Privately Operated  0  7  2  3  3.0 
Escapes  Public    3  0  2  6  2.8 
 
Privately Operated  0  0  0  1  0.3 
Average number of inmates per prison  Public    636.6  626.5  671.5  694.7  657.3 
  Privately Operated  337.5  402.5  422.5  447.3  402.5 
Note. Source: Internal files. Departamento de Execução Penal do Estado do Paraná. (n.d.). (registros internos). Curitiba, PR, 
Brasil. 
Hence,  in  comparison  to  the  two  other  cases,  the  Brazilian  case  suggests  that  private 
participation in this sector might lead to lower costs and superior quality performance indicators.  
 
 
Beyond Property Rights Distribution: Alignment and Performance 
 
 
Considering  our  three  cases,  France,  Brazil,  and  the  U.S.,  only  one  country  bundled  the 
construction and service phases into one contract, as suggested by Hart (2003): the U.S. The two 
others did not and nevertheless exhibit performance differences, suggesting that the bundling issue is 
only one factor of the problem. Our analysis suggests that the incomplete contract theory (Hart et al., 
1997) does not provide a comprehensive picture of what is happening and that performance is not only 
an  issue  of  public  versus  private  property  and  bundling  versus  unbundling,  but  is  related  to  the 
combination of several elements, which together can lead to a superior governance structure.  
Table 3 summarizes the main characteristics of private participation in prison services in each of 
the three countries. The aggregated information can be useful for our analysis. After analyzing the 
table, reasons for the differences can be organized according to three main factors: incentive schemes 
and contractual design, institutional setting, and decision rights assigned to private operators. The table 
shows  that  there  are  a  significantly  higher  number  of  prisoners  housed  in  prisons  with  private 
operations in France, which suggests it is considered to be a successful model. However, in Brazil ― 
with both lower costs and higher quality ― only a small proportion of the prison population is held in 
prisons with private involvement. These counter-intuitive results could be associated  with the few 
comparative  studies  existing  in  both  countries,  leaving  the  public  and  even  government  officers 
without a clear picture of the outcomes from private provision. In addition, in the Brazilian context, 
citizens tend not to favor private engagement in the provision of public services. Such resistance poses 
additional constraints to privatization initiatives (Cabral, Lazzarini, & Azevedo, in press). In addition, 
the  inherent  complexity  of  prison  services  may  thwart  either  outsourcing  or  PPP  ventures.  These 
factors can explain the limited number of privately operated facilities in Brazil compared to France 
and the U.S., in which the number of inmates held in private prisons is almost three times the total 
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Table 3 
 
Effects of Private Actor Participation in Prison Services 
 
Country  United States  Brazil  France 
Beginning of private participation   1983  1999  1990 
Number  of  facilities  under  private 
operation and/or management  
270  14  40 
%  of  inmates  in  privately  operated 
facilities 
7.4 %  1.5%  36% 
Mode of participation  Privatization  Services Outsourcing  Services Outsourcing 
Type of Contract  Bundled and 
Unbundled 
Unbundled  Unbundled 
Activities kept with the government   None  Warden and external 
vigilance. 
Warden, External and 
internal security, 
administrative controls, 
judicial assistance and 
health care 
Private  companies  decision  rights 
level  
High  Medium  Low 
Costs effects  Decreasing (-)  Decreasing (-)  Increasing (+) 
Quality effects   Decreasing (-)  Increasing (+)  Increasing (+) 
Looking at  Table 3 and following Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (2008), we believe that the 
performance of prisons management depends on property rights distribution in addition to contractual 
design and institutional constraints.  
 
Incentive schemes and contractual design  
 
The incentive schemes proposed by governments to reward the private operators may influence 
the performance of the service provided. In prison services specifically, the contract specification must 
incorporate the proper incentives for the private operator and must include elements that preserve the 
broader interests of society.  
In the U.S., the general rule is that private operators charge the governments a daily-based rate 
for each inmate under their supervision (Bayer & Pozen, 2005). Therefore, their financial performance 
is dependent on the number of man-days they can hold. There are strong incentives to keep prisons at 
full occupancy rates and in order to assure their cost-savings, private operators may pay lower wages 
and reduce staff benefits (Camp & Gaes, 2002; Schneider, 1999), thus reducing quality, as suggested 
by Hart et al. (1997).  
It  is  not  an  easy  task  on  the  part  of  the  government  to  check  such  practices  and  enforce 
correction of occasional quality problems in the U.S. privatized prisons. Indeed, to the best of our 
knowledge, there is no on-site supervisor appointed by the public authorities within privately operated 
facilities  in  U.S.  Furthermore,  contracting  out  prison  services  is  not  trivial  because  it  involves 
activities for which it is difficult to write, supervise and adapt performance clauses (Levin & Tadelis, 
2010). More precisely, although some security and order dimensions (i.e. the number of escapes and 
riots) are not hard to measure, the assessment of the output of other quality aspects is not (i.e. the level 
of force against inmates and/or the quality of the meals provided to inmates)
(2).  
In line with the theories of incentives (Roberts, 2010), the presence of non-contractible quality 
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U.S. context to prioritize short-term results and to ignore the long-term implications of their actions. 
This is particular acute in settings plagued by multitasking, whereas agents are likely to denote less 
efforts to activities that are poorly measured (Holmstrom & Milgrom, 1991). This can be one of the 
causes of the lower levels of inmate care quality in U.S. private prisons (Camp & Gaes, 2002). The 
market structure may also explain the U.S. results. Actually, the major private prison businesses are 
traded on a stock exchange, thus increasing the pressures for profit (Schneider, 1999).   
In France, the private operators  who have a reduced role in prison operation  earn a fixed 
amount  that  covers  costs  and  provides  an  expected  profit  margin  according  to  prison  capacity. 
Received theories suggest that the cost-plus contracts are not recommended when cost reduction must 
be pursued. However, although cost-plus contracts allocate risks mainly on the buyer side, they may 
create incentives for improved quality (Bajari & Tadelis, 2001).   
Accordingly, “if for some reason the agreed number of inmates held is exceeded, we receive 
additional  compensation  based  on  clauses  previously  foreseen  in  the  contract”  (Private  Operator 
Executive 2, France). Since there are no performance clauses in the contracts, the private operators’ 
earnings  do  not  depend  directly  on  the  results  obtained.  In  addition,  as  the  French  government 
payments cover private operators’ costs, the  incentives to spend less and promote  investment that 
leads to cost reductions are not strong. Further, the salaries of private employees do not differ from 
equivalent positions in civil service. The consequence of this contractual scheme is reflected in the 
cost indicators: prisons with privately provided services are more expensive.  
In contrast, the superiority of the private companies in terms of quality seems to be related to the 
fact that these firms have solid experience in facilities management, as we learned from government 
officials. All they had to do “was to adapt their practices to the correctional sector and take advantage 
of their background in the private sector” (Government Officer 1, France). Indeed, one of the prison 
providers  is  part  of  the  Sodexo  Group  (a  worldwide  supplier  of  food  and  facilities  management 
services).  As  the  living  conditions  are  one  of  the  main  causes  of  a  peaceful  or  turbulent  prison 
environment, private operators in France are keen to prioritize higher quality in sensible areas like 
cleaning and food, as pointed out in the following quote: “we have two customers: the penitentiary 
administration  and  the  inmates”  (Private  Operator  Executive  1,  France).  Besides  their  inherent 
capabilities, private operators in France have incentives to build and sustain good reputations, which 
can be helpful in obtaining extra business with public authorities. For example, the Lille-Sequedin 
prison (partially operated by SIGES) supplies food services (catering) to two other public prisons in 
the  region  and  official  documents  stress  the  role  of  the  capabilities  of  the  private  operator  as 
mandatory for signing new contracts with the French government (Cour des Comptes, 2010).  
However, the type of contract signed between the French government and private operators may 
generate  negative  externalities  affecting  some  public  prisons.  As  the  contracts  foresee  additional 
payments to the private company when the prison is running above its capacity, the government avoids 
sending more inmates to the prisons with hybrid operation (Cour des Comptes, 2006). Consequently, 
“public prisons present higher levels of overcrowding. And, this factor contributes to a more turbulent 
internal  environment,  which  creates  additional  problems  for  the  managers  of  public  prisons” 
(Politician, France).  
On the other  hand, the reduction  of uncertain  events within hybrid  operated prisons allows 
private operators (and civil servants working in this kind of facility) “to focus on the facility priorities, 
moving the necessary resources to assure the provision of services” (Private Operator Executive – 
France 1). Hence, although the contracts between French authorities and private companies do not 
contain performance clauses (Cour des Comptes, 2010), we cannot ignore the role of implicit and 
explicit incentives when we analyze the reasons for the differences between the public and hybrid 
modes of prison service provision in France. 
In  Brazil,  by  analyzing  the  agreements  between  the  local  authorities  and  prison  service 
operators  in  the  country,  we  can  observe  that  the  contracts  signed  foresee  a  payment  to  private 
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contractors and is likely to reduce the costs of services provision (Bajari & Tadelis, 2001). In the 
Brazilian case, there are two possible situations that can increase the profit margins of the private 
operator: (a) a reduced number of inmates under its responsibility; and, (b) the implementation of 
optimization  efforts.  Naturally,  the  price-cap  contract  mode  would  potentially  stimulate  efforts 
towards cost reduction at the expense of quality (Hart et al., 1997). However, the presence of on-site 
public supervisors can constrain opportunistic behavior.  
With regard to the reduction  in the  number  of inmates,  we  can  observe another  interesting 
aspect. In addition to providing savings in some direct expenses (less food, lower consumption of 
energy,  etc.),  having  fewer  prisoners  in  a  prison  can  also  generate  another  positive  externality:  a 
peaceful internal environment. The reduction in the number of prisoners will likely reduce the number 
of eventual internal conflicts among inmates. According to the type of contract signed in Brazil, in the 
case of undesired events such as riots, the private company is responsible for repairing damage to the 
facility. Therefore, the operator also has a strong economic motivation to maintain a calm and peaceful 
internal  environment.  It  is  also  evident  that  a  non-turbulent  internal  environment  allows  prison 
managers “to concentrate their attention on the resolution  of  other internal problems” (Warden  of 
Outsourced Prison 2, Brazil).  
Since Brazil has a large deficit in the correctional sector, private operators have incentives to do 
their best in order to obtain additional contracts in the future. Reputation matters, and in this case, the 
presence of weak incentives (Roberts, 2010) can explain the motivation of the private companies to act 
in the government’s interests.     
 
Institutional constraints  
 
Prison managers (public or private) can deploy several strategies to increase prison performance 
standards. Nevertheless, some of these actions are dependent on the ability of the prison managers to 
deal  with  certain  institutional  constraints.  Prison  services  are  constrained  by  several  formal 
institutions: political, regulatory, external, and judicial (Shirley & Ménard, 2002). Normally, it is up to 
the  courts  to  determine  who  goes  to  prison,  who  is  released,  or  which  prisoner  has  the  right  to 
alternative sanctions other than incarceration. Thus, the reduction in the number of inmates in the 
prisons is dependent on the efficiency of legal matters and also on the social choices shared by the 
local judicial community (Cabral & Azevedo, 2008). In this sense, judges in conservative locations are 
keener to hand down harder sentences, as can be seen in the U.S. (Schneider, 1999).  
However, the slow pace of the judicial system is a stylized fact in many countries, mainly in 
those where institutions are not mature (Ayres, 1998). Such institutional problems signal precaution to 
prison  managers  as  the  delay  in  delivering  judgments  might  generate  internal  conflicts  inside  the 
correctional facility, mainly when those judgments are related to benefits to be conceded to inmates, 
such as appeals, probation, parole and other prisoner rights assured by law (Cabral & Azevedo, 2008).  
In order to bypass such institutional constraints, private operators have economic motivations 
and alternative mechanisms for dealing with judicial constraints. We noticed in our research that in the 
Brazilian case some private operators reward their lawyers according to the number of release orders 
obtained.  At  their  own  expense,  one  company  also  hires  administrative  assistants  to  support  the 
operational tasks of the local court. The company’s collaborative approach with the local court can be 
a  way  of  avoiding  overcrowding  in  the  privately  operated  prison,  as  corroborated  by  a  Brazilian 
private operator executive:  
“The good relationship with local courts is essential for our operation. We always try to establish strong 
ties with judges. We understand their situation and sometimes we help them to overcome their material 
limitations by hiring assistants for the administrative and operational tasks of the courts. Thanks to these 
practices  the  processes  involving  the  inmates  under  our  custody  run  faster  when  compared  to  other 
locations  …  it  does  not  mean  corruption,  because  there  is  no  money  or  other  material  concessions 
involved” (Private Operator Executive – Brazil 1).     S. Cabral, S. Saussier    114 
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Of course, politicians and human rights people contested the suggestion that the situation above 
is a win-win situation  during  our interviews. However, it is  evident that for prisons under public 
management there are few chances of bypassing local judicial restrictions, and consequently a warden 
of a publicly managed prison has fewer instruments to control undesired effects that might arise from 
the slow legal pace of some courts.  
The relative success of the Brazilian case (when compared to the performance observed in the 
local  prisons,  which  are  publicly  managed)  can  tell  us  something  about  how  the  combination  of 
different factors can be a key element in the choice of governance structure. Nevertheless, such a 
configuration may not be stable when considering the existence of a weak institutional setting. Abrupt 
change in certain institutional components is a plausible possibility (Cabral et al., in press). Thus, 
contractual  performance  is  likely  to  be  affected  in  response  to  shifts  in  political  and  regulatory 
institutions as pointed out by private operator executives in Brazil:  
“the main problem in our business is the uncertainty. Subnational governments in Brazil do not always 
pay us on a regular basis, which generates cash-flow problems” (Private Operator Executive – Brazil 1). 
“If  the  government  delays  our  payment,  which  it  usually  does.....of  course  this  causes  me  a  lot  of 
problems, but, you know, we must tolerate, avoid arguing and so on in order to keep a good relationship 
with  government  officers….to  get new  contracts  I need  them  to  put  in  a good  word  on  my  behalf” 
(Private Operator Executive – Brazil 3).  
On the other hand, institutional stability is responsible for the creation of credible commitment 
mechanisms that contribute to increasing performance (Shirley & Ménard, 2002). This seems to be the 
case in French prisons: 
“The contract is a means of guaranteeing that the services will be performed accordingly….and for sure 
the very fact that the French government is a credible customer makes things easier for us” (Private 
Operator Executive – France 2). 
Nevertheless, the use of strong ties between prison businesses and politicians signals precaution. 
This situation is fairly documented in the U.S. (Dilulio, 1996; Schneider, 1999), noting that it may 
harm the public interest at the expense of commercial and ideological grounds (Wacquant, 2001). 
 
Decision rights  
 
In the U.S. private model, where public supervision is less intense in comparison with the other 
two cases, almost all decision rights are allocated to the private operators. The companies are able to 
establish the details related to building the correctional facility and issues related to details in the 
operation, such as the allocation of prisoners to cells, education, and labor activities policies (Logan, 
1990). It is difficult for the government to monitor the behavior of the private operator (Dilulio, 1996). 
Some of the delegated services are not completely contractible because they are not verifiable (e.g. the 
use of violence, skills and level of employees). In this contract framework the private companies are 
likely to have stronger incentives for profit maximization-oriented actions via cost reduction at the 
expense of quality, as foreseen by the received theories.  
In the French and Brazilian outsourced models, the decision rights are split between government 
officials and private operators. What varies notably from one contract type to another is the degree of 
tasks  delegated  to  non-governmental  operators.  Private  operators  are  keen  to  be  more  flexible  to 
manage and coordinate the work of different suppliers when compared to the traditional provision. 
Further, the signed-contracts may guarantee that the services will be delivered and operations will not 
be interrupted.  
“The contract forces us to respond to government needs….we are more flexible, faster and effective than 
the government to hire and purchase” (Private Operator Executive, France 2).  
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In addition, an important characteristic of hybrid forms is the presence of civil servants inside 
the prison, as they are able to verify the quality of the services provided and occasionally enforce 
sanctions in the case of certain contractual non-conformities (see Cabral et al., 2010). The presence of 
public  supervisors  enables  the  separation  of  operation  and  management,  which  may  foster  the 
enforcement of sanctions in case of contractual non-compliance (Cabral & Azevedo, 2008). Also, on-
site public supervision provides an additional level of control, whereas public and private manager 
may jointly interact to solve operational problems. This is possibly the mechanism through which we 
observe an increase in quality standards in Brazil and France as opposed to the United States, where 
quality is likely to decrease, as illustrated in the following quotes:  
“Civil servants are society’s eyes in the outsourced prisons” (Government Officer 3, Brazil). 
“In  fact, in the  outsourcing mode  as  a  warden I have  more  time available  to  focus  on  the  strategic 
activities. For example, it´s not up to me solve problems regarding the quality of the food. It is up to the 
manager of the private operator to solve it” (Warden of Outsourced Prison 1, Brazil). 
“The government plays a leading role in the outsourcing mode. If  the government assigns a corrupt 
warden to supervise our work, we will be in trouble…a good warden must act with probity and enforce 
the contract if we have some fault…if I have an operational problem I want to know” (Private Operator 
Executive – Brazil 2). 
The level  of  delegation  is also responsible for the  cost  differences between the two  hybrid 
models. In France, fewer activities are delegated than in Brazil, where civil servants make up a smaller 
proportion of the employees in privately operated facilities. The maintenance of the status quo helps to 
crystallize current practices in France, which can hinder the adoption of managerial innovations. In 
addition, from a financial point of view, in Brazil and the U.S. civil servants generally receive higher 
salaries and receive benefits that are not available in private companies. All of these factors lead to an 
increase in costs when public management is concerned (Laffont, 2000). 
 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
 
Despite  the  fact  that  private  participation  in  prison  services  is  fairly  covered  in  theoretical 
economic  models,  few  studies  compare  distinct  governance  structures.  In  our  analysis,  we  found 
striking differences in the outcomes. In the United States, private participation leads to cost-quality 
trade-off.  In  France,  we  observe  an  increase  in  both  dimensions,  while  Brazil  demonstrated  cost 
reductions with an improvement in quality. It is natural to ask why such differences occur. 
We argue that the achievement of an appropriate governance structure does not rely on property 
rights distribution, but rather on the way incentives, contractual design, decision rights, and the nexus 
of  institutions  interact.  The  combination  of  all  these  factors  might  have  a  strong  impact  on 
performance  indicators,  in  either  a  positive  or  a  negative  sense.  The  ability  of  public  or  private 
mangers  to  deal  with  and  occasionally  bypass  imposed  institutional  constraints  is  essential  in  the 
choice of the contractual mode. Our results suggest that public managers must also consider the role of 
on-site public supervisors in order to monitor the behavior of private agents and take discretionary 
choices about punitive issues. Private operation with public supervision might enable the viability and 
the legitimacy of public and private agreements in prison services, while at the same time assuring that 
private sector capabilities will be driven to address the interests of the society.  
There  are  several  avenues  for  future  investigation.  First,  more  studies  comparing  PPP  with 
traditional public provision are still needed. In addition, there is a need to understand the different 
forms of incentives resulting from the interaction between decision rights and institutional constraints 
and how these factors complement each other. Risk allocation issues across the different contract types 
might  be  addressed  in  future  investigation.  Further,  if  on-site  public  supervisors  are  assigned  to 
monitor private companies in prison services, a pressing question emerges: who will supervise the S. Cabral, S. Saussier    116 
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supervisor? How may strong and weak incentives thwart collusion between public officers and private 
agents? In our context, implicit incentives from reputational concerns may avoid quality deterioration. 
In any sense, additional research in other public utilities other than prisons remains necessary.  
 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
 
A preliminary version of this paper received the Carolyn Dexter Award 2011 in the Public and Non-Profit Division of the 
Academy of Management (San Antonio). We thank an anonymous referee, and seminar audiences at the International Society 
for New Institutional Economics (Boulder), the Academy of Management Meeting (San Antonio), the European School for 
New Institutional Economics (Corsica), and the Brazilian Academy of Management (São Paulo) for their contributions to this 
paper. The authors also thank CNPq (National Council for Scientific and Technological Development), and the School of 
Management of the Federal University of Bahia for financial support. The usual caveats apply. 
 
 
Notes 
 
 
1 In Brazil and in France judges decide where the convicted will serve her (his) sentence. In some states in the United States 
judges may assign a specific facility or may order an inmate to complete a particular program, which may only be available at 
one institution. In some state sentencing laws this decision is left to corrections departments so they can make classification 
determinations (i.e., using an instrument to determine a person’s risk to institutional safety, typically minimum, medium or 
maximum). However, in the three countries it generally is within a judge’s power to sentence an individual to a particular 
institution, for any reason, mainly including requirements about security level or reentry of prisoners.   
2 Some recent PPP contracts are incorporating performance clauses to measure quality aspects in prison services provision 
even for inmate amenities. For instance, in the PPP of the Itaquitinga Integrated Reentry Center for 3,126 inmates, the 
government of the Pernambuco State in Brazil introduced several performance clauses to be verified by an independent 
auditor. This new contractual arrangement differs from the three models covered in the present paper and may imply different 
outcomes as compared to those observed in our paper. Further investigation is required. 
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